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Introduction
The European Union is seeking to establish a place for 
itself in Central Asia in the face of a Chinese presence 
that is growing exponentially and a Russian influence 
that continues to be strong. Grand speeches about 
the EU’s partnership with the Central Asian states 
notwithstanding,  relations  between  both  regions 
have  remained  rather  limited.  Already  hindered 
by the absence of any long-term strategy, relations 
have further faltered owing to Brussels’ inability to 
reconcile its political and economic objectives. The 
EU’s numerous assistance programs have made it look 
like a complex, costly and barely effective bureaucratic 
institution. Since 2007, however, the EU has sought 
to  speak  with  a  more  affirmative  voice  in  Central 
Asia and has started to exert its economic influence; 
today, it is one of the main trading partners of the 
five states, and is striving to transform the bilateral 
economic relations of its member states into an overall 
strategy that would have a broader impact on Central 
Asian societies. The Strategy for a New Partnership 
announces EU support for WTO accession for each of 
the four Central Asian states that are not yet members, 
as well as for improved access for Central Asian products 
to EU markets through the renewed EU Generalised 
System  of  Preferences  (GSP  –  2006/2015).1  The 
strategy  also  aims  to  encourage  exports,  economic 
diversification  and  market-economic  structures,  in 
particular by developing public-private partnerships.2 
Central Asia represents a limited market for the EU: 
the five states have less than 60 million inhabitants, the 
majority of whom have a very low standard of living, 
with the exception of the Kazakhstani middle classes. 
Indeed only Kazakhstan, which has a per capita GDP 
of $11,500, has experienced any kind of prosperity, 
while Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan continue 
to be very poor, with per capita GDP levels of between 
$2,600 and $2,100 (figures for Turkmenistan come 
in around $6,000, thanks to its income from gas).3 
On the trade front, therefore, Central Asia is not of 
much  interest  –  which  is  why  the  EU’s  economic 
involvement  in  the  region  remains  overwhelmingly 
dominated by the hydrocarbon sector. Putting this 
industry to one side, it soon becomes apparent just how 
fragile, disproportionate and limited other business 
and trade relations between the EU and Central Asia 
are. Yet after the global recession has ended, some 
commercial opportunities are likely to emerge that 
could stimulate regional trade, possibly linked to the 
region’s geography and the China-Europe transport 
corridor. This paper will thus seek to assess the state of 
the three following elements: trade relations between 
the  EU  and  Central  Asia  (with  the  exception  of 
energy); the diversity of economic interests of each 
of the EU member states and of the different EU 
regions; and industries in which European companies 
are already well-established. 
The  EU’s  commercial  involvement  in  Central  Asia 
enables it to further European goals in the region. 
These include consolidating the overall EU-Central 
Asia  relationship,  avoiding  an  excessive  reliance  by 
Central  Asian  countries  on  a  few  markets;  helping 
to strengthen the institutions of civil society, which 
in  turn  could  speed  up  the  arrival  of  a  substantial 
European presence; developing the rule of law, the 
private sector and transparency in government; and 
finally, addressing poverty, the root cause of instability. 
The present paper will thus reflect upon the pertinence 
of having a collective EU business and trade agenda 
with Central Asia, what stands to be won and lost 
both economically and socially, and the goals it might 
include. It has become essential to ascertain whether 
or not this agenda ought to be placed at the service 
of more global European strategies for promoting its 
social model, and if so, to what extent. 
I. THE EU AS ONE OF THE MAIN 
PARTNERS OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN 
STATES
The EU Share of Central Asian Foreign Trade
To  better  understand  the  EU’s  role  as  a  trading 
partner of the Central Asian states it is crucial, in the 
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first instance, to look at its market share in the Central 
Asian  economies  considered  as  a  single  economic 
unit. When doing so, however, it should be borne in 
mind that trade relations are established by individual 
companies, not EU countries as such. This makes it 
difficult to flesh out a communitarian-wide strategy in 
areas that remain not only national, but also private. 
Several  other  problematic  elements  should  also  be 
mentioned. 
First,  there  is  the  difficulty  associated  with  the 
fact  that  no  common  legal  framework  exists  for 
the region, since only Kyrgyzstan is a member of 
the WTO. Turkmenistan has not yet presented its 
candidacy,  and  Tajikistan  and  Uzbekistan  are  still 
far from meeting the necessary criteria. Kazakhstan, 
the  only  plausible  candidate,  should  be  eligible 
for membership shortly. The EU’s trade relations 
with  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan  and  Uzbekistan 
are  governed  by  a  Partnership  and  Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) - a non-preferential agreement in 
which the parties grant each other ‘most favoured 
nation’ status (MFN), thus prohibiting tariffs and 
quantitative  restrictions  in  bilateral  trade.  EU-
Tajikistan bilateral trade relations are governed by 
an Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related 
matters,  pending  ratification  of  the  PCA  signed 
with  Tajikistan  in  2004.  The  PCA  signed  with 
Turkmenistan in 1998 has not yet been ratified by 
the EU due to the domestic political situation (see 
infra). As a result, EU-Turkmenistan trade relations 
are  still  based  on  the  Trade  and  Cooperation 
Agreement signed with the Soviet Union in 1989. 
All five Central Asian countries are beneficiaries of 
the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences.4 With 
the  exception  of  Kyrgyzstan,  the  Central  Asian 
countries - especially Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, 
which have very protectionist economies - have all 
placed numerous restrictions on business, which has 
resulted in a limiting of trade relations.
The EU is the main trading partner of the Central 
Asian region, accounting for almost a third of its total 
foreign trade (29.1% in 2007), and  amounting to 
€22.9bn in 2007.5 However, if one looks at bilateral 
trade figures for individual states, Russian-Central 
Asian trade and Sino-Central Asian trade dwarf all 
other states. In 2007, Russia and China dominated 
the foreign economic relations with Central Asian 
states, with trade worth $21 billion with Moscow6 
and  $14  billion  with  Beijing,7  whilst  Germany  - 
Central  Asia’s  main  European  trading  partner  – 
came to less than €7 billion for the same year. 
EU-Central Asia trade is marked by the paramount 
position of the energy sector. About 80% of the EU’s 
imports from Kazakhstan are oil products, while for 
Turkmenistan  the  figure  is  90%.  For  Uzbekistan, 
the figure drops to 30%, although it remains in the 
top product grouping in terms of value.8 An area of 
special  importance  to  the  national  economies,  the 
energy sector is subject to its own set of geopolitical 
volatilities and can lead to very paradoxical results in 
the social sphere. Therefore, it cannot be taken into 
consideration in terms of a classic business pattern.
It is also important to stress the marked imbalance 
in economic relations between the EU and Central 
Asia. While the EU as a whole constitutes one of the 
foremost trading partners of Central Asia, the reverse 
is not true. In 2007, Kazakhstan represented less than 
1% of total European imports and 0.5% of its exports, 
placing it 29th in the list of the EU’s trading partners. 
The other Central Asian states are even further down 
the  rankings.  This  flagrant  trade  imbalance  cannot 
be remedied by political will alone. Compared to the 
other regions of the world, Central Asia is restricted 
at the economic level, since its basic wealth consists of 
its geopolitical position and energy resources. While 
the  EU  has  every  reason  to  develop  its  economic 
presence in Central Asia - in view of its political and 
geopolitical objectives -, Central Asia is not likely to 
become a crucial trading partner in comparison with 
the relationship with North America and the emerging 
Asian powers. 
Imbalances in Trade Relations (2007)9
Position of country 
as  EU  trading 
partner  (imports, 
exports):
Position  of  the 
EU  as  trading 
partner (imports, 
exports):
Kazakhstan 29th (22th, 36th) 1st(2nd, 1st)
Uzbekistan 79th (69th, 93rd) 2e (2nd, 1st)
Turkmenistan 120th (106th, 122nd) 3rd (1st, 3rd)
Tajikistan 142th (116th, 151st) 3rd (6th, 1st)
Kyrgyzstan 147th (163rd, 133rd) 4th (3rd, 8th)
Finally, Kazakhstan’s share of trade with the EU is 
not in keeping with that of other states in the region. 
Kazakhstan emerged as the principal Central Asian 
partner of the EU from the beginning of the 1990s. 
The  development  of  trade  between  the  EU  and 
Kazakhstan has risen exponentially, from $6.2 billion in 
2003 to close to $14 billion in 2005 and $19.4 billion 
in 2007.10 Uzbekistan is in second place - far behind 
its  Kazakhstani  competitor  -,  while  Turkmenistan 
is  the  third  most  important  of  the  Central  Asian 
countries.  Trade  with  Kyrgyzstan  and  Tajikistan 6  EUCAM Working Paper No. 1
remains minuscule and the establishment of foreign 
companies in these two countries is extremely limited, 
often being linked to EU assistance programs. 
Trends in EU business by Central Asian country
Exports and imports, millions of EUR
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Source : <trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html>
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  The Heart of EU-Central Asia Economic Relations: 
Germany 
The  number  one  European  manufacturing  power, 
the second-largest exporter in the world in terms of 
volume,  and  the  fourth-largest  economic  power  in 
the world, Germany is the key partner driving EU 
relations with Central Asia. The German-Kazakhstani 
partnership is conceived both by Berlin and Astana as 
a long-term one, and it is based on old and indirect 
historical links that are related to the German diaspora 
in  Kazakhstan  (close  to  one  million  people  by  the 
end of the Soviet Union, although today the figure 
is  little  higher  than  200,000).  During  the  1990s, 
most of this diaspora returned to settle in Germany 
and in doing so some of its participants turned into 
economic  middlemen  seeking  to  develop  bilateral 
trade relations. In terms of Germany’s trade with CIS 
countries, Kazakhstan is in third position after Russia 
and the Ukraine; Kazakhstan is second behind Russia 
for  imports  and  is  in  fourth  position  for  exports, 
behind Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Bilateral trade 
reached a value of €2.9 billion in 2004, but then went 
up to €5.6 billion in 2007 (an increase of 17.6% in 
comparison to the preceding year). 
Although  Berlin  is  interested  in  the  energy  sector, 
it is not seeking to invest in large-scale hydrocarbon 
projects,  but  rather  in  areas  of  medium-sized 
infrastructure  with  high-added  value,  including 
industrial  production,  manufacturing  such  as  the 
car  industry,  construction,  the  electronics  industry, 
agriculture,  and  the  management  and  training 
of  qualified  specialists.  The  interest,  moreover,  is 
mutual.  Indeed,  Kazakhstan’s  strategic  framework 
for industrial and technological development aims to 
attract Germans who will invest in industrial sectors 
not related to hydrocarbons, that is, the transformation 
technologies  and  six  pilot  industries  (construction, 
tourism,  agriculture,  transport  infrastructure, 
agribusiness and the textile industry). German interest 
in these sectors can be explained by the specific nature 
of its economy, in particular the importance of small 
and medium-size companies to it, representing 80% 
of  its  economic  activity.  Taking  into  account  the 
slowdown  in  demand  for  the  products  of  German 
manufacturing in both Europe and the United States, 
the post-Soviet and Chinese markets have assumed 
a new importance for German car companies on the 
lookout for new openings. In addition, they see the 
potential of Kazakhstan as a gateway to expand into 
Asia. 
Germany considers Kazakhstan its principal Central 
Asian partner, but it is striving to develop relations 
with all the countries of the region, even if trade figures 
with the other states are relatively negligible. Berlin’s 
second-largest partner in the region is Uzbekistan. 
The volume of trade between the two countries was 
$329 million in 2007. Areas of cooperation stretch 
from light industry and transport-related services to 
the production of medical goods and pharmaceuticals 
and the transformation of agricultural products. In 
Turkmenistan,  German  companies  essentially  work 
in the medical, textile, transport and communication 
industries, as well as in agriculture. 
Traditional Trade Partners: Italy, France, United 
Kingdom, Benelux
The  Italian  economy  is  marked  by  strong  regional 
contrasts, but nevertheless it has many aces it can play, 
including a reputation for savoir-faire. Dominated by 
small and medium-size firms, however, it has been 
struggling to establish itself in the world market. It 
is one of Kazakhstan’s main trading partners, mostly 
thanks to the AGIP leadership in the North Caspian 
Sea  Consortium  in  Kashagan.  Bilateral  trade  has 
risen  considerably  over  recent  years,  reaching  $8.9 
billion in 2007 (including $7.7 billion of Kazakhstani 
exports and $1.2 billion of imports). Cooperation is 
developing in very diverse areas, stretching from the 
treatment  of  agricultural  and  industrial  resources, 
to  light  industry,  foodstuffs  and  the  construction 
of agricultural equipment. As in the case of France, 
Italian trade with Uzbekistan has dropped over recent 
years  because  of  Tashkent’s  policies  which  do  not 
favour foreign investment. However, Rome remains 
interested in Uzbeki textiles. 
Whilst  it  has  a  presence  in  Central  Asia,  Paris  has 
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investing in the region. France is Kazakhstan’s fifth 
largest  trade  partner,  behind  Russia,  China,  Italy, 
and  Switzerland.  Trade  between  the  two  countries 
has  increased  considerably  over  the  last  few  years, 
reaching close to $4 billion in 2007 (including $3.3 
billion  in  exports  and  $603.8  million  in  imports). 
Kazakhstani exports to France consist essentially of 
oil, metals and metallurgical, chemical and agricultural 
products; while Kazakhstan buys electrical, electronic 
and  manufacturing  equipment,  basic  consumer 
goods,  medicines  and  cosmetics,  cars,  foodstuffs 
and  construction  materials  from  France.  Though 
the  import  and  export  patterns  have  many  aspects 
in common with other European countries, France 
distinguishes itself through its reputation for wine, 
seafood,  cheese,  perfumes,  cosmetics,  clothes  and 
accessories. In terms of the volume of investments, 
France is in fourth place, after the Netherlands, the 
United States and Great Britain: on 1st October 2007, 
the volume of French investments in the Kazakhstani 
economy was $3.76 billion (including $2.82 billion 
DFI).
The  UK  has  become  Kazakhstan’s  third-largest 
European economic partner. In the space of a few 
years, the level of trade between the two countries 
has risen considerably, reaching $1.8 billion in 2007. 
Kazakhstani exports include a predominance of primary 
materials (ferrochrome, steel, copper, wool, fertilizer, 
precious and semi-precious metals), and its imports 
are essentially related to the transformation industry, 
technological  innovation  and  scientific  components 
(transport equipment, high technology devices, optics 
and chemical products) but also foodstuffs (alcohol, 
tobacco) and textiles. For many years, the UK was 
the largest investor in the Kazakhstani economy after 
the United States: from 1993 to 2003, the volume 
of British investments rose by $3.65 billion, 13.8% of 
the total of DFI received by Kazakhstan. Overtaken 
by the Netherlands in 2007, it comes in at third place 
at present with $15.2 billion - including a billion DFI. 
The UK is looking to diversify its investments in sectors 
other than hydrocarbons, such as new technologies, 
technology  and  science  parks,  and  agricultural 
production. The UK has also displayed its sensitivity 
to  Astana’s  wish  to  become  a  regional  financial 
centre. Regional exchanges are particularly developed 
thanks to the Scottish town of Aberdeen, which has 
developed partnerships with Atyrau, Mangistau and 
western Kazakhstan. UK trade with Uzbekistan is far 
more modest - $162 million in 2007. 
The world’s tenth-largest economy, the Netherlands, 
is one of Central Asia’s main investors, especially in 
Kazakhstan. The Netherlands is particularly interested 
in foreign investments because its economy is heavily 
dependent on foreign trade. The Netherlands has been 
testing out new markets in the post-Soviet region, 
often by exploiting its key position in air transport, 
following a bumpy patch over the last decade for its 
transport sector. The Netherlands is also one of the 
world’s largest exporters of agricultural and market 
garden produce. The commercial relations between 
Kazakhstan  and  the  Netherlands  are  relatively 
extensive: in 2007, bilateral trade came to a total of 
around  $2.8  billion,  including  $2  billion  worth  of 
exports  from  Kazakhstan.  Many  projects  linked  to 
solar, wind and hydroelectric power are also underway. 
Between 1993 and 2008, the Netherlands invested a 
total of $39 billion (which included over $7 billion in 
DFI), thus making it Kazakhstan’s foremost foreign 
investor. These investments are in the energy sector, 
the  financial  sector,  transport  and  communications 
and the transformation industries. The Netherlands’ 
relations  with  Uzbekistan  have  dropped  drastically 
over  the  last  decade;  the  numbers  are  of  fourfold 
decrease. Trade had risen to $200 million in 1996, 
but dropped to $40 million in 2006 (although there 
was a noticeable increase again in 2007, up to $55.9 
million). 
As with the Netherlands, Belgium is heavily reliant 
on foreign trade (exports constitute two-thirds of its 
GDP). Today it occupies 13th place among Kazakhstan’s 
European trade partners. Trade volume has markedly 
increased in the last few years, from $66.9 million in 
2003 to $297 million in 2007. Kazakhstani exports 
to Belgium include non-ferrous metals, wool, textile 
products, base metals and their derivatives and chemical 
products, while Belgium exports machinery, industrial 
and  electronic  equipment,  textiles,  agribusiness 
and  chemical  products  and  tobacco.  Cooperation 
between the two countries is developing in the health 
and construction sectors. As for Luxembourg, it is 
chiefly reliant on the banking sector and the prospects 
for  cooperation  with  Kazakhstan  are  promising  in 
this sphere. Agreements are being drawn up for the 
training  of  Kazakhstani  financiers  and  bankers  in 
Luxembourg.  As  banking  secrets  are  protected  by 
law in the country, Luxembourg’s banks are also well 
placed to provide facilities for the personal wealth of 
Central Asian heads of state. The country, moreover, 
hopes to participate in glass manufacturing as well 
as  air  freight  transportation  through  the  Cargolux 
Company.
Spain, Sweden, Finland, Greece and Austria
Spain’s  economic  growth  throughout  the  decade 
of  2000  has  made  it  potentially  one  of  the  most 8  EUCAM Working Paper No. 1
important  partners  for  Central  Asia.  Its  trade  with 
Kazakhstan rose to $906 million in 2007 - double the 
2005 level. For its part, Kazakhstan exports mineral 
and chemical products to Spain, and from the same 
territory  it  imports  foodstuffs,  alcoholic  and  non-
alcoholic beverages and tobacco, as well as chemical 
products, plastic materials, rubber and resin-derived 
products, electronic and mechanical equipment, and 
transport  materials.  There  is  not  much  trade  with 
Uzbekistan  to  speak  of.  Sweden  and  Finland  are 
also  well-established  in  the  region,  particularly  in 
Kazakhstan; trade between Sweden and Kazakhstan 
has  reached  $534  million,  whilst  Finland  and 
Kazakhstan  traded  goods  and  services  worth  $732 
million in 2007. The volume of exchange has in fact 
doubled since 2004/2005. Kazakhstan mainly exports 
chemical products and metals, and imports transport 
equipment and telecommunications materials, as well 
as many wood-derived and agricultural products.
With  Austria,  relations  remain  rather  restricted;  in 
2007  there  was  $232  million  worth  of  trade  with 
Kazakhstan. Central Asia - Greek trade relations are 
more insignificant even still, amounting to only $80 
million (again with Kazakhstan) in 2007. However, 
Greece has advantages to build on. First of all, members 
of the Greek minority in Central Asia, who were either 
deported to the region or settled there in the 1930s, 
and who contribute to the development of economic 
relations through the creation of small joint-ventures. 
Secondly, the Greeks have a reputation for the world’s 
foremost  shipping  businesses,  something  of  great 
interest to Kazakhstan, which is currently looking for 
international cooperation to help develop its Caspian 
merchant fleet. Trade between Central Asia, on the 
one  hand,  and  Denmark,  Portugal,  Ireland,  Malta 
and Cyprus, on the other, is minuscule, or even non-
existent. 
Central European Partners: Central Asia as a Market 
for the Taking
There are several interesting constellations emerging 
between Central Europe and Central Asia. Slovakia 
and Slovenia remain only marginally present in the 
Central Asian market, while Bulgaria and Romania 
are essentially interested in energy issues related to the 
Caspian-Black Sea axis. For its part, Poland – which 
is a regional power in Central Europe - is becoming 
increasingly involved in Kazakhstan, energised as it is 
by the presence of its diaspora. In 2007, the volume 
of exchange between the two countries was around 
$884 million. Regional agreements have been signed 
between  the  Almaty  region  and  that  of  Mazovia, 
which is one of the most dynamic in Poland.  The 
Poles are particularly interested in the construction 
sector, in agriculture and in the Kazakhstani chemical 
industry.  Trade  between  Hungary  and  Kazakhstan 
has  also  increased,  multiplying  six-fold  between 
2003  and  2007,  and  finally  reaching  $350  million 
in 2007. Lastly, Kazakhstan and the Czech Republic 
have stepped up trading links, with $336 million of 
business concluded in 2007.
Trade between former “brother countries” thus all 
follows the same pattern. All of these countries are 
chiefly interested in Central Asian oil and metallurgical 
products, as well as in the region’s textile production. 
In 2006, for example, cotton fibre accounted for two-
thirds of Czech imports from Uzbekistan (although 
this figure is due to drop because the Czech textile 
industries  are  becoming  weaker  and  Uzbekistan  is 
hoping to treat the cotton itself). From the perspective 
of the Central European states, then, Central Asia is a 
promising market waiting to be developed. The other 
side of the coin is that Central Europe - albeit not as 
competitive as Western Europe – does have chemical 
industries (cleaners, fertilizers) and also manufactures 
the kind of technical equipment which is interesting 
to the Central Asian countries;  cheaper than from 
world markets, it is better quality than the Chinese 
offer. This holds true for pharmaceutical production 
from Central Europe too, as well as certain foodstuffs 
(for example, Czech beer, Hungarian cooked meats) 
and the timber and furniture sectors. 
The Baltic Market: Developing the Central Asian-
Baltic Axis 
Since Soviet times, the Baltic states have been one of 
the main bases for the export of Central Asian products 
to Europe - particularly cotton, but also metallurgical 
products. The Baltic countries have also specialised 
in the construction and delivery of buses, trams and 
carriages,  as  well  as  in  telephone  communications; 
with the fall of the USSR, however, their industries 
went  into  crisis  and  trade  relations  collapsed,  only 
to take off again at the start of 2000. Latvia remains 
Kazakhstan’s  main  Baltic  trade  partner  (bilateral 
exchanges rose to $196 million in 2007), followed 
by Lithuania ($118 million in 2007) - Estonia being 
more marginal ($46 million in 2007). Kazakhstani 
exports are mostly made up of combustible minerals, 
oil and heavy metals, whereas Baltic imports include 
automobiles,  pharmaceutical  products,  electrical 
devices  and  products  for  livestock  farming.  Nearly 
90%  of  Uzbeki  cotton  apparently  continues  to  be 
exported through the ports of the Baltic Sea.
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and Central Asia concerns transit and freight. In this 
area, Kazakhstan does not hide its ambitions; its “Path 
to  Europe”  programme  clearly  states  its  intention 
to  become  one  of  the  main  communications  hubs 
between Asia and Europe. It therefore naturally has 
its sights set on the market of the Baltic ports. The 
Baltic countries, for their part, hope to benefit from 
the  construction  of  a  railway  line  and  a  road  that 
would link them to Central Asia and then to Iran, 
thus encouraging North-South exchanges. In 2003, 
on the initiative of the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, 
Russian  and  Kazakhstani  railway  administrations,  a 
Baltika-Transit project for goods trains was launched, 
as part of an attempt to reorganise Central Asian transit 
around the Baltic ports. Since the three Baltic States 
joined the EU in 2004, exchanges with Central Asia 
have in fact intensified, in particular in the ports of 
Riga, Liepaia and Ventspils. Kazakhstan has proposed 
to Estonia that the two engage in joint ventures in the 
free trade zone between the port of Muuga and that 
of Tallin. In 2005, moreover, Kazakhstan opened a 
terminal for cereals in Ventspils - the first of its kind in 
Europe. The port of Klaipeda also hopes to become 
one  of  the  export  centres  for  Uzbek  agricultural 
products,  which  are  of  interest  to  the  Lithuanian 
textile industry. However, these relations between the 
Baltic and Central Asian states depend almost entirely 
on their common Russian neighbour and the good 
will it shows in its tariff policy.
A Brief Industry Analysis
A quick review of the industries which entail relations 
between  the  EU  states  and  Central  Asia  reveals 
five  distinctive  areas  (excluding  the  hydrocarbon 
industries). After defining these, we will very briefly 
list the main European firms that have established a 
presence in Central Asia.
The nuclear industries are likely to be one of the future 
driving forces behind Europe’s increased presence in 
Central Asia, whether on account of uranium extraction 
in  Kazakhstan  or  Uzbekistan,  or  the  construction 
of nuclear power plants in partnership with Astana 
(Areva).This is also true for the military and aerospace 
sectors. Here businesses range from state industries 
-  such  as  the  military  hardware  industries  (France 
is  Europe’s  largest  arms  exporter)  -  to  Europe’s 
aeronautic and aerospace businesses (Thales, EADS, 
Finmeccanica, British Aerospace). The issues related 
to the latter industries not only relate to business, but 
also  state  security  interests  and  geopolitical  issues. 
Business  dedicated  to  the  extraction  of  precious 
minerals and metallurgy can be added to this category 
(Oxus  Mining,  Awex,  Hambledon  Mining,  Aurum 
Funds, Eramet), as well as elements of Central Asia’s 
electrical sector (Alstom, First Alpeen Hydropower), 
in which European firms are well-established, despite 
strong international competition. 
The EU has other options and strengths. The most 
obvious, but not necessarily the most profitable (since 
it  involves  sums  that  are  quite  modest),  relate  to 
industries exploiting traditional products with cultural 
connotations, such as cosmetics, perfumes and luxury 
clothes in the case of France, but also (though to a 
lesser degree perhaps) in the case of the rest of Europe: 
tobacco from Benelux, marble and jewellery from Italy, 
wood products from Scandinavia and Central Europe, 
and foodstuffs from throughout the EU, alongside 
luxury  crafts  and  alcoholic  beverages.  Such  quality 
products have a worldwide reputation, to which the 
Central Asian markets are not impervious, even if their 
commercial impact remains modest because they are 
aimed at the middle and upper classes, which are not 
sizeable in the region. 
The  EU  can  also  boast  several  areas  of  expertise 
where it is capable of rivaling current international 
competitors in Central Asia. In manufacturing, the 
dominant area is probably the car industry (Mercedes-
Benz, Volkswagen, BMW, Škoda, Renault, Peugeot-
Citroën, Volvo), followed by sectors such as chemicals 
(BASF,  Bayer,  Foster  Wheeler  Italiana,  Maksam), 
construction  (Bouygues,  Knauf,  Scania,  Budimex, 
Besix, J.C. Decaux), glass (Saint-Gobain, Pilkington 
Glass),  cement  (Heidelberg  Cement  Group,  Vicat) 
and cotton (Geocoton), as well as certain types of 
industrial equipment (ThyssenKrupp, Bosch, Alstom) 
- although the latter are often too expensive for Central 
Asian economies, which prefer to get their supplies 
from  the  Asian  markets.  We  can  add  agribusiness, 
which  is  becoming  increasingly  sophisticated,  as 
well  as  specific  agricultural  techniques  such  as  the 
treatment of cotton, to the list. European know-how 
in maritime trade and shipping might also be of interest 
to Kazakhstan and possibly also to Turkmenistan.
Another great strength of the European economy is 
its high-tech sectors, linked to technological, scientific 
and biological innovation. This is the case, for example, 
with  mobile  phone  companies  (Nokia,  Ericsson, 
Alcatel,  Teltronic),  IT  and  telecommunications 
(Deutsche Kabel AG, Indra), optics and the medical 
sector  (Siemens),  biotechnology  related  companies 
such  as  those  of  the  pharmaceutical  sector  (Inter 
Medico,  Novo  Nordisk,  Solvay  Pharmaceuticals, 
Sanofi-Aventis, Berlin-Chemie AG/Menarini), road, 
rail  and  air  transport  companies  (BAE  Systems, 
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nanotechnologies and companies that are linked to 
environmental issues such as solar, wind and hydro-
electrical  energies  (Iberdrola,  Vivendi,  Degrémont, 
Culligan Italiana, Générale des Eaux). These EU areas 
of  expertise  deserve  support  in  their  international 
trade efforts. 
The fifth and final big sector is training and education 
services – an area where the EU has a strong world-
wide reputation, both in terms of the quality it offers 
and quantity. This sector includes scientific research, 
the  finance  and  banking  system,  strategic  advice, 
financial engineering and advanced medicines. One 
of the major objectives of the European Commission 
in the years to come is to ensure the growth of the 
European economy’s competitiveness, and therefore 
the  focus  is  upon  innovation,  something  equally 
beneficial to promote in Central Asia.
II. ADOPTING A COLLECTIVE EU 
BUSINESS AGENDA?
The conclusions drawn from this brief presentation 
of  business  relations  allow  for  no  ambiguity:  the 
current  EU  engagement  in  Central  Asia  is  shaped 
by  the  interests  of  large  companies,  mainly  in  the 
energy  sector.  Small  and  medium-sized  European 
companies  are  weak  in  the  Central  Asian  market, 
which  is  considered  too  high-risk  to  warrant  even 
modest  private  investments.  The  EU  itself  cannot 
proceed by political willpower alone and fly in the face 
of the economic realities of the Central Asian markets. 
Compared to many other regions of the world, Central 
Asia is not a profitable region for European companies 
- the cost of labour is relatively high, the technical 
skills developed in the Soviet era are in the process of 
disappearing, the investment climate is bad, and the 
political context is fragile. However, the activities of 
European companies in Central Asia should be about 
more than just trade and making a profit; they also 
ought to promote a certain European way of life and 
provide the model of a market economy that respects 
social rights more than the American version. In the 
long term, the objective is to spread the European 
model to people who since the start of the 1990s have 
tended to identify the market economy and democracy 
with falling living standards and brutal and increasing 
deprivation.
This  raises  several  questions,  with  no  clear  cut 
answers. Firstly, if it were to present itself as a trading 
power, in which industries does the EU risk finding 
itself in competition with the other powers present 
in the region? Secondly, can the promotion of the 
business sector find a place in the EU’s overall strategy 
without contradicting its political objectives? Thirdly, 
is it necessary to create special European incentive 
mechanisms  in  certain  key  areas?  Fourthly,  should 
the  objective  be  to  promote  the  kind  of  business 
strategy which engages with notions of a respect for 
social rights and principles of good governance whilst 
supporting  the  emergence  of  the  middle  classes? 
Fifthly, should the EU lend its support to businesses 
that  deal  with  important  ethical  issues,  such  as 
the fight against poverty? As is often the case, the 
solutions envisaged do not so much depend on the 
type of relations maintained with Central Asia, as on 
internal EU choices and the ability of member states 
to reconcile their competing interests. 
Growing Competition with Neighbouring Powers?
The first question raised above is that of the growing 
competition with the other powers present in Central 
Asia. Given that it is not usually considered as a trading 
power block, when the EU suddenly appears in this 
guise, it runs the risk of creating new tensions. The 
issue here is whether the price to be paid in this respect 
is too high. With the exception of the energy sector, 
the Central Asian market is sufficiently under-exploited 
across a whole range of industries to mean that there is 
plenty of room for each power at the table - by setting 
up in agriculture or in the transformation industries, 
for  example.  Such  extremely  investment  intensive 
industries require international mergers, such as the 
hydroelectric projects in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
In  addition,  many  European  areas  of  expertise  do 
not clash with their Russian or Chinese counterparts, 
because  they  involve  state-of-the-art  technologies 
(Pharma-Biotech,  optics,  nanotechnologies,  etc.) 
which these countries do not as yet possess. On the 
other  hand,  European  firms  cannot  compete  with 
their  Chinese  competitors  in  areas  such  as  textiles, 
footwear, electrical goods, etc. The only exceptions 
here are European “national representation” products 
(mentioned above).
However, several industries may come to attract stiff 
competition in the future. This is of course the case in 
the military hardware industry - in which Russia and 
China compete directly with NATO member states - 
and in aeronautics and the aerospace sector (Russia 
is  leading  cooperation  with  Kazakhstan,  though 
India is also selling itself as a possible future partner). 
Competition may also increase in the banking sector 
-  while  China  offers  banking  support  mainly  in 
relation to inter-state cooperation on large projects, 
the  Russian  banks  are  setting  up  in  the  sectors  of 
finance, real estate, and the sale of bank services and 
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competition with the European banks. Beijing is also 
looking to take control of the market for information 
technology and the associated technology parks in 
Kazakhstan, which once again places China in direct 
competition with European and Russian firms. All of 
these territories are bound, in addition, to clash with 
one another in the mobile phone sector. 
Does the Business Sector Fit with the Overall EU 
Strategy? 
Can this promotion of the business sector be given a 
place in the EU’s overall strategy in relation to Central 
Asia? Here again, the EU’s problems in presenting a 
united front outwith EU frontiers have their roots 
in the  internal difficulties involved in harmonising 
the priorities of members states. Germany tends to 
privilege  its  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises, 
which – as previously noted - are at the heart of the 
German economic dynamo. France and Italy, on the 
other hand, tend to defend their large public and 
private companies. So long as European states cannot 
agree on business priorities, they will be unable to 
implement  a  coherent  European  policy  in  Central 
Asia. 
The establishment of a common European agenda 
will have other advantages. For instance, it will permit 
the smoother integration of the new member states 
into the joint European business dynamic. As we saw 
above, these new member states - Central Europe, 
the Balkans and the Baltic states - are not indifferent 
to  the  Central  Asian  market;  they  could  therefore 
play the role of bridgehead in certain specific markets 
and areas. Although this would be unlikely to have a 
major impact on the Central Asian market, it would 
nonetheless help these new members of the EU to 
develop areas of expertise and therefore enable them 
to establish their place within the internal European 
market. 
The question of the relation between the EU’s political 
agenda, the economic interests of European business 
and the EU’s energy policy also arises. For instance, 
the conclusion of Interim Trade Agreements (ITA) 
between the EU and Central Asian countries seems 
to be an issue, especially in relation to Turkmenistan. 
In February 2009, Turkmen President Gurbanguly 
Berdymukhammedov  made  it  known  that  he  was 
waiting for concrete offers relating to his country’s 
participation in the Nabucco project. The conclusion 
of an ITA could be an element in this rapprochement, 
but this has been blocked by the European Parliament 
since 2006 because of the human rights situation in 
the country. The discussions held between political 
groups and lobby groups in the European Parliament 
reveal clear divergences of opinion when it comes to 
choosing between energy interests and the human 
rights issue. To date, Ashgabat has still to adopt the 
recommendations listed in the Parliament’s resolution 
on this question to date.12 Lastly, it was not until 2008, 
after repeated actions from human rights groups in 
protest of the forced child labour involved in cotton 
harvesting  in  Uzbekistan  that  the  largest  British 
supermarket chain, TESCO, declared it would refuse 
to sell Uzbeki cotton, a stand backed by large textile 
consumers such as Wal-Mart, Hennes & Mauritz, JC 
Penney and Marks & Spencer.13 The debate about 
excluding Uzbeki cotton from the generalised system 
of preferences has yet to be concluded.
In theory, Europe could also make use of its business 
potential to help spread the social model it incarnates. 
The  EU  could  thus  choose  to  privilege  business 
relations  that  commit  the  participants  to  ensuring 
certain legal standards in economic activity and to 
strengthening the rule of law. This could be done, 
for instance, by giving preference to Central Asian 
companies that are committed to respecting the rights 
of local workers, to fighting corruption, promoting 
fair  competition  and  good  corporate  governance, 
and  recognising  the  importance  of  contracts.  The 
long-term objective would be to increase the social 
responsibility of Central Asian companies - something 
that  has  indirect  repercussions  on  the  societies 
themselves in so far as it favours the emergence of 
a middle class that has political clout. But can the 
EU really promote a “clean business environment” in 
Central Asia when on its own doorstep it has tax havens 
– particularly in Luxembourg - where Central Asian 
heads of state, their families and the oligarchs close 
to them deposit money siphoned off from national 
wealth? Can it emphasise respect for human rights, 
when Bouygues fought to win the most grandiose 
construction projects of former dictator, Saparmurat 
Niazov, in Turkmenistan and also actively participated 
in the president’s personality cult?14 Still, even if EU 
companies have been involved in corruption around 
the world, they are nevertheless more accountable to 
civil society, other governments and shareholders and 
have a stronger imperative to act according to the law 
and in socially responsible ways.  
Creating Incentive Mechanisms for Target Sectors
As  the  commercial  sector  is  for  the  most  part 
driven  by  private-sector  actors,  its  motor  is  the 
profit  motive  which  entails  competition  between 
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cooperation  abroad.  For  example,  one  cannot 
imagine  cooperation  between  the  main  German 
and  French  car  manufacturers  in  Central  Asia,  nor 
in other industries such as machinery, chemical and 
industrial products: European firms rival one another 
in the penetration and domination of foreign markets. 
Whilst it is difficult to envisage a change in the ground 
rules – those of the market economy - it is nonetheless 
possible to envisage European mechanisms (financial 
advantages through tax reduction, legal aid for the 
setting-up  of  companies,  etc.)  which  might  favour 
cooperation between the firms of different member 
states and make their alliance profitable with regard to 
specific projects aimed at the Central Asian market. 
In  addition,  some  areas  of  trade  have  more  of  a 
European  flavour  than  others.  This  is  true  of  the 
agricultural  sector,  for  example  -  the  common 
agricultural policy (CAP), which is one of the EU’s 
main  pillars,  and  could  include  mechanisms  that 
enable  businesses  specialised  in  this  area  to  export 
their technologies in association with other European 
companies. The main agricultural powers - France, 
Poland  and  Spain  -  could  thereby  attempt  to  see 
some of their agricultural companies or agribusinesses 
come  together.  This  type  of  common  European 
agenda could be established equally in several other 
sectors: finance in general and banks in particular, air 
transport (passengers and goods freight), and other 
areas of technological expertise. The EU thus seeks to 
promote synergies that will give rise to pan-European 
companies, and such a dynamic could serve relations 
with Central Asia well. 
The Fight against Poverty
The Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia, 
adopted in 2007, channels EU aid towards three main 
objectives:  stability  and  security,  the  fight  against 
poverty, and regional cooperation between the states 
of Central Asia themselves and with the EU (in the 
areas of energy, transport, higher education and the 
environment). Companies could thus be favoured to 
the extent that they assist in the fight against poverty, 
in  particular  in  rural  areas.  Approximately  60%  of 
Tajikistan’s population lives below the poverty line, 
as do 50% of those in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.15 
The  rapid  impoverishment  of  the  Uzbek  Fergana 
Valley also entails a high political risk - agriculture, 
in  which  60%  of  the  populations  of  Turkmenistan 
and Tajikistan are employed (and more than 40% of 
that of Uzbekistan), is characterised by its massive de-
mechanisation and high overpopulation. 
The  EU  might  therefore  implement  mechanisms 
which help to establish European businesses specialised 
in agrarian matters and able to offer a whole range 
of integrated activities. With regard to Central Asia, 
for  example,  it  could  promote  the  already  existing 
European strategy of “poles of rural excellence”, which 
is  at  once  designed  to  respect  the  region’s  natural 
riches,  to  encourage  an  environmentally-friendly 
mode of resource management, to provide services 
for the population (such as the upkeep of schools, 
hospitals, roads and public transport networks), and 
to  attempt  to  produce  local  arts  and  crafts.  Many 
objectives might come together here - the fight against 
poverty in rural regions; slowing the rural exodus to 
cities; increasing the EU’s visibility amongst poor and 
culturally  marginalised  populations;  and  facilitating 
the  presence  of  small-scale  European  enterprises 
that, without specific EU support mechanisms, will 
be  unable  to  promote  their  innovative  activities  in 
Central Asia. 
Promoting the Health Sector and Others with a 
Strong Ethical Significance 
The  EU  has  every  reason  to  promote  industries 
that deal with major ethical issues, as much for the 
protection of its own population - which is confronted 
with global threats that know no borders - as for the 
promotion of its concept of an economy respectful 
of human beings and the future of the planet. Three 
sectors are key here: bio technologies, in particular 
pharmaceutical  technologies;  ecology;  and  food 
security. Central Asia is in a very fragile position with 
respect to all three of these.
Central Asian populations lack medicines and their 
pharmaceutical markets tend to be invaded by Russian, 
Chinese  and  Indian  products  that  do  not  always 
respect the strictest standards. In addition, given the 
lack of financial strength of Central Asian households 
and  the  overall  privatisation  of  the  health  market, 
Central Asia has been flooded with imitation products 
at best ineffective in fighting illness and disease, and at 
worst dangerous to public health. Helping European 
companies to set up in Central Asia, especially those 
which produce generic medicines, thus amounts to 
a critical task. The importance of the Soviet legacy 
in health care ought to be noted here – the memory 
of a public health system that was freely accessible to 
all  makes  Central  Asian  public  opinion  particularly 
sensitive to the health question. For an EU seeking to 
prove it can have a positive impact on people’s daily 
lives, this could be an area ripe for intervention. The 
health sector indeed is one in which the EU’s social 
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Promoting  ecological  business  is  also  a  growing 
economic niche market, and in this regard the Central 
Asian states have a significant Soviet legacy, this time 
a  negative  one.  The  existence  of  heavily-polluting 
industries in certain urban regions (around Karaganda, 
Tashkent  and  in  several  areas  of  Kyrgyzstan)  is 
having a major impact on public health (producing 
dermatological and respiratory illnesses in particular) 
and  on  already  weakened  ecosystems.  The  know-
how  of  European  business  concerning  such  issues 
ought to be pointed out and advertised here. It is 
important to note that European companies work in 
areas including the promotion of low-cost, renewable 
energies (solar, wind and hydroelectric power), the 
treatment of industrial waste, and the construction 
of air and water treatment systems to be applied in 
polluting industries. It would also be worthwhile to 
look  at  more  time-specific  and  modest  operations, 
such  as  the  implementation  of  operational  waste 
management systems in urban areas, the construction 
of  waste  disposal  units  according  to  international 
sanitary  norms,  and  the  construction  of  miniature 
water  treatment  plants  near  hospitals  and  rural 
schools. On this point, too, the impact on the relevant 
populations should be a priority, since it would give 
the EU a political visibility which to date it does not 
have amongst the majority of Central Asians.
The  issue  of  security  in  the  food  industry  is  also 
crucial at the geopolitical crossroads such as those that 
Central Asia is facing. Given the bird flu epidemics 
that have come from China, as well as the bad state of 
the food industry in Russia and the post-Soviet states 
more generally, this area is one which EU business 
and its savoir-faire could look to establish and build. 
What is needed here is equipment for sanitary and 
epidemiological control throughout the agribusiness 
sector; the setting-up of large agricultural firms in line 
with hygiene norms; equipment for refrigeration and 
freezing; electricity generators, etc. In this area, once 
again, the EU could encourage European companies 
by implementing special mechanisms and trying to 
beat off the competition from Asian companies willing 
to take advantage of the region’s legal vacuum and 
sell products that do not comply with ethical norms. 
Emphasising the Human Factor
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, it ought to be 
recalled that one of the areas of European expertise lies 
in taking the human factor into account. The greatest 
wealth  of  a  country  or  a  company  stems  from  its 
development of human potential, not only its profit-
making ability. This philosophical credo, associated 
with the European quality of life, constitutes one of 
the best advertisements for the European model in 
the world in general, and in Central Asia in particular. 
To emphasise the human factor in the business sector 
is to insist on the importance of professional training 
and services. These elements ought therefore to be 
made  clear  in  the  EU’s  Central  Asian  policy.  One 
of  the  only  real  aspects  of  long-term  wealth  these 
states have is their people - not their natural wealth 
or their geographical situation. The EU could thus 
give  priority  to  technical  and  technological  aid,  to 
training artisans, industrial workers and the whole set 
of tertiary-sector jobs, and to supervision and training 
at all levels of career development. 
Recommendations
Businesses  are  private  and  so  states  cannot  impose 
political  objectives  that  run  counter  to  the  market 
economy.  Investment  decisions  are  based  on 
commercial judgments, not on political or geopolitical 
ones. Nevertheless, the EU can implement mechanisms 
that  provide  positive  and  negative  incentives,  and 
focus its efforts on some key activities.  
- Legal systems and a business-friendly environment
1°  The  EU  should  work  with  the  Central  Asian 
governments to promote EU standards in products 
(high-quality  goods)  and  in  business  practices  (the 
strict rule of law in the drafting of contracts, market 
regulation,  tendering,  etc.).  According  to  such  a 
framework, the issue of free trade and membership 
of the WTO is important. Within the proposed new 
PCA  agreement  with  Kazakhstan,  for  instance,  the 
EU could focus on trade issues.
2° The EU should take into account the difficulties 
faced by small and medium-sized businesses who wish 
to operate in Central Asia. The best way of promoting 
them  is  to  foster  the  commercial  conditions  that 
would  allow  them  to  invest:  open  and  transparent 
markets, observing the rule of law in business matters, 
protection of investments, common standards.
3° The EU should help to establish a trade infrastructure 
– roads, railways, better connections by air – and work 
on trying to ease border controls, using the already 
existing institutions such as CAREC, the World Bank 
and the ADB. 
- Positive and negative incentives
1°  The  EU  should  define  its  negative  incentive 
mechanisms.  It  should  outline  the  areas  of  “dirty 
business” that are to be excluded from European trade 
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of Uzbek cotton because of the use of child labour, 
whilst chemical products produced by high-polluting 
industries from the Soviet era are also banned). 
2°  The  EU  should  publish  information  packages, 
showing  how  different  business  sectors  can  benefit 
from the EU’s aid mechanisms. 
3° The EU should reinforce the historical links between 
the EU and Central Asia by promoting businesses that 
have been set up by the diasporas – indeed, Central 
Asia’s Germans, Poles and Greeks have an important 
role to play in the small and medium-sized companies 
who trade with their respective “homelands”. 
- Focus on key activities
1° The EU should prioritise EU engagement in the 
markets where it can make a difference in terms of 
trading practices (especially Kazakhstan, and potentially 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan), as well as in those 
places where business is essentially a component of 
development (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan).  
2°  The  EU  should  strengthen  its  representation 
in  the  region  by  establishing  EU  delegations  with 
commercial  sections  that  provide  assistance  to  EU 
companies in terms of information and contacts. It 
should also promote the European model, by working 
with professional business associations in Central Asia 
- accountants, chambers of commerce, state financial 
managers, regulatory bodies etc. 
3° The EU should focus on economic criteria, giving 
priority to EU areas of excellence in the long term 
and  at  a  global  level,  such  as  high  quality  goods, 
state-of-the-art technology and services. This would 
make it possible to allow Central Asian enterprises to 
benefit from a transfer of technology and know-how, 
via cooperation with European firms. This would also 
imply Europe listening to the demands of the Central 
Asian states that want to invest in new value-added 
sectors  and  escape  their  dependency  on  primary 
resources. Astana, for instance, wants to become the 
financial centre for the whole region and to develop a 
merchant fleet; Bishkek wants to develop the service 
industry  that  is  linked  to  the  transit  of  Chinese 
goods.
4° The EU should focus on political criteria. It should 
give priority to enterprises that adhere to certain legal 
standards in economic life and that seek to strengthen 
the rule of law in the context of their implementation 
in  Central  Asia.  In  addition,  it  should  promote 
domains  with  political  value,  such  as  information 
technology. This would prevent the market from being 
dominated by the authoritarian Russian and Chinese 
regimes, which for the local populations would have 
consequences regarding their access to information. 
5° The EU should pay attention to social criteria. It 
should  give  priority  to  companies  whose  activities 
will  help  the  fight  against  poverty  in  Central  Asia 
and which respect ethical and ecological norms, thus 
indirectly  providing  Central  Asian  societies  with  a 
better future.
6° The EU should focus on business education within 
the EU education initiative.
Conclusion
As we have seen, and putting the energy sector to one 
side (which mainly consists of hydrocarbons but also 
of uranium), EU-Central Asia trade relations remain 
quite  limited  and  it  will  be  difficult  to  strengthen 
them, either from Brussels or from the Central Asian 
states.  Despite  the  limited  profitability  of  Central 
Asia’s  industrial  and  tertiary  markets  –  especially 
outside of Kazakhstan -, and the difficulties Brussels 
faces in trying to influence the free market, the EU 
should be highly interested in promoting a discussion 
about trade as a driving force in development. The 
major  consequences  of  the  global  crisis  on  the 
Central Asian economies - from the most developed, 
like Kazakhstan, to the weakest, like Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan - in fact confirm that the economic question 
has to be a central element of European strategy in the 
region. Central Asia will not be able to avoid social 
and religious destabilisation unless it has the prospect 
of development - mostly in the rural areas but also 
among the deprived urban sections (especially since 
the  region’s  demographic  dynamics  are  producing 
more and more young people keen to improve their 
standard of living). If industry is unlikely to make for 
a profitable market - given its proximity to China -, 
the service sector will nevertheless be a key future 
axis in the Central Asian economies, as will business 
activities related to development. The EU therefore 
has every reason to implement forms of development 
assistance which, by helping European companies to 
establish themselves in the market, will play a key role 
in reducing Central Asia’s social vulnerability= and 
will contribute to the fight against poverty, which is 
currently the main issue that needs to be addressed 
by  the  international  community  and  by  regional 
governments.Business and Trade Relations between the EU and Central Asia - Sébastien Peyrouse  15
(Endnotes)
1   Kyrgyzstan, which joined in 1998, is currently the only Central 
Asian country to have joined the WTO.
2   The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership, 
Brussels, 2007, pp. 17-18. 
3   See the CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/>.
4  <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/cis/index_
en.htm>.
5  <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/cis/index_
en.htm>.
6   V. Paramonov, A. Strokov, The Evolution of Russia’s Central 
Asian Policy, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom: Central 
Asia Series, 2008, p. 15.
7  This figure is based on information provided by the Central 
Asian states. This largely underestimates the scale of trade with 
China  and  takes  into  account  neither  cross-border  trade  nor 
smuggling. The probable figure for 2007, according to Chinese 
estimates, is closer to $18 billion.
8  “Kazakhstan. EU Bilateral Trade and Trace with the World”, 
September 2008, “Uzbekistan. EU Bilateral Trade and Trace with 
the World”, September 2008, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/
bilateral/data.htm>.
9  Table compiled on the basis of official figures available for 
each country at <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/data.
htm>.
10  <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/
kazakhstan/index_en.htm>/
11   All the figures presented in this section are publicly available. 
For Kazakhstan see <http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/
ru/content/policy/cooperation/europe_america>;  for  Uzbekistan 
see  <http://mfa.uz/rus/mej_sotr/uzbekistan_i_strani_mira/
uzbekistan_strani_evropi_es/>.  The  other  sites  of  the  Foreign 
Ministries do not contain these. Specific figures, often conflicting 
and unverifiable, are nevertheless available on the websites of the 
European embassies in Central Asia.
12  The resolution demands that authorisation be given for the 
International Committee of the Red Cross to have free access to 
the country, that all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience 
be released, that all restrictions preventing Turkmen citizens from 
travelling abroad be abolished, and that NGOs and human rights 
organisations be allowed to operate in the country: <http://www.
rferl.org/Content/EU_Weighs_Image_Energy_In_Relations_With_
Turkmenistan/1496786.html>.
13  Gulnoza Saidazimova, ‘Uzbekistan: Cotton Industry 
Targeted By Child-Labour Activists’, January 19, 2008, <http://
www.rferl.org/content/article/1079375.html>.
14  See the book of David Garcia, Le pays où Bouygues est roi, 
Paris: Danger Public, 2006.
15  For  more  details,  see:  Central  Asia  Human  Development 
Report; Bringing Down Barriers, Washington: UNDP, 2005. 
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